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Abstract 
Models decomposing the redistributive effect of fiscal systems into vertical and horizontal effects 
are extensively used by practitioners. The Duclos, Jalbert, and Araar’s (2003) model, despite its 
advantages, has not yet been widely employed in empirical research, possibly due to a relatively 
challenging implementation procedure that involves the estimation of expected post-fiscal incomes. 
To override these difficulties the designers of the software DAD (Duclos, Araar, and Fortin 2010) 
have incorporated a module for implementation of the model. However, the application of this 
module on Croatian tax-benefit system data revealed certain inaccuracies in the results. Carefully 
unfolding the calculation and estimation procedures needed for implementation of the model, this 
paper instructs practitioners on how to correctly apply the model and helps DAD designers improve 
their module.  
Keywords: redistributive effect, vertical equity, horizontal inequity, pre-fiscal equals 
JEL: D63, H22, H23 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Duclos, Jalbert, and Araar (2003) (henceforth DJA) have designed a comprehensive model to 
decompose the redistributive effect (RE) of a fiscal system into vertical, classical horizontal inequity 
(henceforth CHI), and reranking effects. The model is built into the framework of the Atkinson-Gini 
social welfare function (henceforth AGF), which first converts incomes into utilities employing the 
Atkinson’s (1970) utility function, and then aggregates utilities using rank-dependent weights, 
which underlie the S-Gini and S-concentration coefficients proposed by Donaldson and Weymark 
(1980) and Yitzhaki (1983).1 
The DJA model has certain advantages over its competitors, the widely acknowledged 
Kakwani’s (1984) (henceforth K84) and the Aronson, Johnson, and Lambert’s (1994) (henceforth 
AJL) decompositions of RE. To measure the CHI effect, the researcher must determine the set of 
counterfactual CHI-free or expected post-fiscal incomes (EPIs). While the AJL model relies on the 
formation of arbitrary groups of close equals in this task, the DJA model employs purposefully 
designed statistical procedures. Consequently, the implementation of the DJA model requires a 
certain expertise related to data smoothing and curve-fitting methods. To facilitate the application 
of the DJA model in empirical analysis, a module for calculation of the DJA indices from the sample 
data is incorporated into the software DAD (Duclos, Araar, and Fortin 2010) (henceforth DAD-DJA).  
The use of DAD-DJA in research on the Croatian tax-benefit system revealed certain 
inaccuracies in the results. Specifically, when the ethical parameter of AGF is set to zero, the CHI 
effect in the DJA model should be equal to zero by construction. However, the estimated value of the 
CHI effect was significantly different from zero. Analysis has shown that DAD-DJA produces upward 
biased estimates of EPIs in the low pre-fiscal income region. Furthermore, it was revealed that the 
fitting procedure in DAD-DJA contains a ‘bug’, producing unreasonably high estimates of EPIs for the 
top pre-fiscal income units in the sample.  
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In an attempt to obtain fully accurate estimates of DJA indices, independent procedures have 
been developed. They are thoroughly explained in this paper to assist practitioners in implementing 
the DJA model and to help DAD designers improve the working of DAD-DJA. A brief overview of data 
smoothing methods is provided, accompanied by advice on how to accurately obtain EPIs estimates. 
Relationships with other measurement models are explained. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly exposes the elements of the 
DJA model and its connections with other decompositions. Section 3 extensively describes the 
procedures of data preparation, estimation and calculation of various elements of the DJA model, 
and employs them on a simple hypothetical population of four income units. In section 4 the 
procedures are applied to data on the Croatian tax-benefit system, and the results are compared 
with those obtained by DAD-DJA. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 THE DUCLOS-JALBERT-ARAAR MODEL 
Post-fiscal income is equal to pre-fiscal income minus taxes plus benefits. The change of income 
inequality induced by a fiscal system consisting of taxes and benefits is called the redistributive 
effect (RE). In measurement terms, we have that ∆   , where ∆ represents RE, and  
and  are indices of pre- and post-fiscal income inequality.  
In the DJA model, inequality indices · are derived using the Atkinson-Gini social welfare 
function, proposed by Araar and Duclos (2003, 2006). For pre-fiscal income we have that 

, , ν   , 


, ν       1 
where  is the ethical parameter configuring the Atkinson’s (1970) utility function, ,  
/1   for   1, and ,   ln for   1, with  denoting the quantiles of 
the pre-fiscal income distribution, and  the income at quantile . The term ν is another ethical 
parameter, characterizing the Donaldson and Weymark’s (1980) and Yitzhaki’s (1983) S-Gini rank-
dependent weighting scheme, , ν  ν1  ν. The equally distributed equivalent income is 
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an inverse function of 
· and is obtained as ξ, , ν  1  
, , ν/ for   1, and 
ξ, , ν  exp
, , ν for   1. Finally, the Atkinson-Gini inequality index is calculated as 
follows: 
  1  ξ, , ν/!"        (2) 
where !" is the mean pre-fiscal income.  is obtained analogously, using the quantiles of the 
post-fiscal income distribution. 
The DJA model decomposes RE as follows: 
∆ #  $  %    &  '  &    '   (3) 
The vertical effect, #    &, represents the potential RE or the reduction of 
inequality that would be achieved by the counterfactual, CHI-free system. The discrepancy between 
potential and actual RE is divided into a CHI effect, $  '  &, and a reranking effect, 
%    ', which measure two different manifestations of horizontal inequity (HI). The 
former effect (C) measures HI emerging from violation of the ‘classical horizontal equity principle’, 
which says that equals should be treated equally. The latter effect (R) evaluates HI arising from 
infringement of the ‘no-reranking principle’, which requires the fiscal process to not change the 
ranks of income units in transition from pre- to post-fiscal income. Take, for example, four 
households of equal size. A and B have pre-fiscal incomes of 10 each, whereas C and D have pre-
fiscal incomes of 20 each. Suppose that A, B, C, and D end up with post-fiscal incomes of 8, 16, 12, 
and 24, respectively. Between pre-fiscal equals (A and B; C and D) CHI has occurred, whereas 
between pre-fiscal unequals (B and C) reranking has taken place. 
In equation (3), & is the inequality index obtained for EPIs, equal to & 
 (|( , where (| denotes a post-fiscal income at the qth quantile among all those income 
units belonging to the pth quantile of the pre-fiscal income distribution. ' represents the 
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inequality index obtained for expected post-fiscal utilities (EPUs) at quantile p, ',  
 (|, ( . For & and ',  we obtain the respective social welfare functions 

& , , ν   &,  , ν and 
', , ν   ',  , ν, while the 
corresponding inequality indices are &  1  ξ& , , ν/!*  and '  1  ξ' , , ν/!*, 
where !* is the mean post-fiscal income. 
In the special case where   0, utilities are identical to incomes: :, 0  :. Therefore, we 
have that (|,   (| across all p and (|, and it follows that 
& , 0, ν 

' , 0, ν and & , 0, ν  ', 0, ν. The consequence for the DJA model is that the CHI effect 
collapses to zero, and the decomposition 3 can be rewritten as 
∆0, ν  #0, ν  %0, ν  , 0, ν  & , 0, ν  , 0, ν  & , 0, ν (4) 
It can be shown that , 0, ν, , 0, ν, and &, 0, ν are the S-Gini coefficient of pre-fiscal 
income, H, ν, the S-Gini coefficient of post-fiscal income, H, ν, and the S-concentration 
coefficient of post-fiscal income, I, ν, respectively.2 
Consequently, #0, ν is equal to the S-Gini Kakwani’s (1984) index of vertical effect, 
#Jν  H, ν  I, ν, and %0, ν is the S-Gini Atkinson (1980), Plotnick (1981), and 
Kakwani’s (1984) index of reranking, %K'Jν  H, ν  I, ν. The Kakwani’s (1984) 
decomposition of RE into vertical and horizontal components can be rewritten in S-Gini terms as 
∆ν  #Jν  %K'Jν  H, ν  I, ν  H, ν  I, ν  (5) 
In another special case, where ν  1, the weights , ν are equal for all p and the 
reranking effect disappears. For  L 0, the vertical and CHI effect, #, 1 and $, 1, become the 
indices consistent with the Duclos and Lambert’s (2000) model of HI measurement.3 
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3 CALCULATION OF INDICES 
3.1. Data Preparation 
A typical research uses the following data for a household or family i: (a) unequivalized pre- and 
post-fiscal incomes, MN  and MN; (b) survey frequency (or sampling) weights, ON; and (c) equivalence 
factor PN. The equivalized pre- and post-fiscal incomes are N  MN/PN and N  MN/PN (hereafter we 
deal only with equivalized incomes, calling them plainly pre- and post-fiscal incomes). The 
frequency weights are defined as φN  ONPN. Thus, the equivalence factor PN is employed both for 
deriving the equivalized income and for weighting households of different types.4 
We form the 3 Q R matrix S, where R is the number of households in the sample: 
S  T …     N …     V …    N …     V
φ …    φN …     φV W        (6) 
To obtain the matrix SX (SY), the columns in S are sorted in increasing order of the 
values from the first (second) row: 
SX  T
X …    NX …     VXX …    NX  …     VX
φX …    φNX …     φVX W;             S
Y  T
Y …    NY …     VYY …    NY  …     VY
φY …    φNY …     φVY W  (7) 
From SX we take out the values NX, NX, and φNX , while from SY the values NY and φNY . and 
are extracted. Notice that the superscript x (n) denotes that income units are sorted in increasing 
order of pre-fiscal (post-fiscal) income. 
The sample estimates of quantiles p and the weights , ν are obtained in the following 
manner: 
ZNX  2Σ ∑ ]φX^ _ φ^X `N^ a           bNX,ν  Σν1  ZNXν        (8) 
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where Σ  ∑ φX^V^a  and φX  0. 
When a large group of pre-fiscal exact equals exists in the sample, one of the inequality 
indices would be biased if based on the weights bNX,ν, namely, cdNX, , ν; bNX,νf from equation (17) 
(see later discussion). Therefore, we derive a new set of weights, ωgNX,ν. Assume that income units 
h  1, … , i have zero pre-fiscal incomes, i.e., X  jX  k  lX  0, and corresponding post-fiscal 
incomes X, jX, … , lX. The procedure described by equation (8) automatically ascribes to these 
units the weights that are strictly decreasing in i and ZNX, i.e., bX,ν L k L blX,ν, although all these 
units have equal pre-fiscal income and rank. Therefore, we replace them with the new set of weights 
obtained as follows: 
ωgNX,ν  d∑ φmXlma f ∑ φnX · bnX,νlna ,  for h  1, … , i        
ωgNX,ν  bNX,ν,     for h L i     (9) 
Thus, the original weights bNX,ν of pre-fiscal equals are transformed into their group average. 
An analogous procedure should be applied to other large groups of pre-fiscal equals, if they exist in 
the sample. 
Alternatively, we could use the original weights and randomize the order of income units 
within each group of exact pre-fiscal equals. This procedure would reduce the bias to an 
insignificant level, but each possible ordering of income units would still result in different values of 
cdNX, , ν; bNX,νf. However, for purposes of consistency and transparency, the use of weights ωgNX,ν is 
recommended. For all the other indices derived below, it is irrelevant whether the weights bNX,ν or 
ωgNX,ν are employed, because the income vectors they are based upon (namely, NX, N,' , and N&) have 
identical values within a group of exact pre-fiscal equals.  
Finally, analogously to the above procedures, the estimates ωgNY,ν are obtained from φNY  (for 
calculation of the inequality index based on NY). 
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3.2 Indices of Inequality 
The following equations show how to obtain utilities, the Gini-Atkinson welfare index, and the 
inequality index for pre-fiscal incomes NX, when   1: 
NX,   NX/1            
o dNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf  ∑ d^X, f · φX^ · ωg X^,νV^a         
pdNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf  1  q1  
o dNX, , ν;ωgNX,νfr sstu/!̂NX    (10) 
where !̂NX  Σ ∑ φX^ ·V^a ^X is the mean pre-fiscal income. To shorten the presentation, the 
formulas referring to the case where   1 are omitted. Analogously, the utilities and indices for 
post-fiscal incomes NY are obtained, as shown by equation (16) in the Appendix. 
pdNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf and pdNY, , ν;ωgNY,νf from (10) and (16) are the sample estimates of the 
indices of pre- and post-fiscal income inequality,  and . As equation (3) indicates, the 
application of the DJA model requires the estimates of two other indices, & and ', derived 
from EPIs, &, and EPUs, ', . 
To obtain the sample estimates of EPUs, N,' , we should smooth a dataset 
wNX, NX, ; φNXxNaV . For each value of ε , we estimate the regression relationship NX,  
y',NX _ zN , to obtain the approximation y{',·. Subsequently, the vector of fitted values is 
calculated as N,'  y{',NX.  
However, the following identity says that the whole procedure of estimating EPUs can be 
circumvented, saving the practitioner’s time and energy in sensitivity analysis using multiple 
scenarios for ν and . Genuinely, the sample estimate of ' is equal to pdN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf from 
equation (20), but it can be derived more simply by the inequality index pdNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf from 
equation (18), because of the following equality: 
pdN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf  pdNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf       (11) 
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To understand why (11) holds, recall that ',    (|, (  and notice that the 
theoretical values (| are represented by the sample values X. Imagine the population 
consisting of two groups of exact pre-fiscal equals: B income units have pre-fiscal income X  and 
post-fiscal incomes X, … , |X, while F income units have pre-fiscal income jX L X  and post-
fiscal incomes |}X , … , |}~X . Their rank-dependent weights are ωgX,ν  k  ωg|X,ν  ωgX,ν  and 
ωg|}X,ν  k  ωg|}~X,ν  ωgjX,ν. For given , the values of expected post-fiscal utilities, N,' , are obtained 
as averages of utilities ,'   ∑ d^X, f|^a  and j,'   ∑ d^X, f|}~^a|} . The welfare is 
then obtained by (20) as 

o dN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf   · ωgX,ν ·   d^X, f|^a _  · ωgjX,ν ·   d^X, f
|}~
^a|}
  ωgX,ν ·  d^X, f|^a _ ωgjX,ν ·  d^X, f
|}~
^a|}  
Observe that according to (18) we would obtain the identical result for 
o dNY, , ν;ωgNY,νf. 
Consequently, pdN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf and pdNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf are also identical. 
3.3 Estimation of Expected Post-fiscal Incomes and Utilities 
Unlike the estimation of EPUs, the evaluation of EPIs cannot be avoided. To obtain the sample 
estimates of &, we must smooth a dataset wNX, NX; φNXxNaV , i.e., approximate the mean response 
curve y& in the regression relationship NX  y&NX _ N . The estimates of EPIs are then obtained 
as N&  y{ &NX, where y{ &NX is the approximation of y&. 
The estimation of EPIs represents the greatest challenge in the implementation of the DJA 
model. Although parametric models (such as polynomial regression) can be appropriate for some 
datasets, it is better to rely on non-parametric approaches, assuming no a priori functional 
relationship between post- and pre-fiscal incomes. One such approach is the ‘kernel-weighted local 
polynomial regression’ (KWLPR). A description of the method can be found in Fan and Gijbels 
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(1996), Wand and Jones (1995), Keele (2008), and Härdle (1990), while the software applications 
include Stata 12 (function lcpoly), R (function loess, package lokern, etc.), and XploRe (function 
lpregxest).  
The choice of the degree of polynomial (p), the type of the kernel function, and the size of the 
kernel half-bandwidth rests on the analyst. For   0, KWLPR becomes the ‘Nadaraya-Watson 
estimator’ (NWE), while for   1 we obtain the ‘local linear estimator’ (LLE). Fan and Gijbels 
(1996) explain that the odd degree polynomials achieve the best balance between bias and 
variability and automatically correct the boundary problem. 
Another interesting smoothing technique came to light during the research: the ‘Fourier 
series in trigonometric form’ (FSTF), which is a sum of sine and cosine functions describing a 
periodic signal (Faunt and Johnson 1992). The estimation procedure is programmed in Matlab 
R2011b’s Curve Fitting Toolbox 3.2, which contains several other fitting methods, such as 
smoothing splines. 
DAD-DJA and supporting documentation5 do not inform us which fitting method is used to 
obtain EPIs for estimation of DJA indices. However, DAD incorporates a separate module, ‘Non 
Parametric Regression’, enabling us to estimate EPIs independently of DAD-DJA. Two basic methods 
are offered: NWE and LLE (henceforth DAD-NWE and DAD-LLE). Experimentation with different 
options and choices offered by the module revealed that in estimating EPIs DAD-DJA in fact employs 
DAD-LLE, using the default set of parameters. 
Before moving further, we offer the following advice to help judge whether the estimates N& 
are appropriate for use in the DJA model implementation.  
(a) Although the fitting methods and their software implementations ensure optimality in the 
statistical sense, the analyst still has the freedom and the responsibility to change some of the 
parameters or the whole estimation method if the results contradict her/his knowledge of the 
appropriate shape of the EPIs curve. An example is a too ‘wiggly’ curve, in which case we have to 
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‘stretch’ it, perhaps by raising the kernel half-bandwidth. Another example may be the existence of 
certain kinks or local minimums (maximums) we are aware of, which are not reflected by the EPIs 
estimate. 
(b)  For certain data points the programmed fitting procedures may produce irregular results. 
Some software tools are ‘smart’ in such cases, leaving a blank space instead of the estimate, while 
others are not. Anyway, if this happens we should fill in the corresponding estimate manually, using 
the best-guess approach.  
(c) A simple preliminary test of the correctness of the approximation y{ &NX is to check 
whether the mean value of the estimated values N& is approximately equal to the mean of the 
sample values NX, i.e., if 
!̂dN&f  !̂NX         (12) 
(d) The discussion in section 2 indicated that when   0, we have that NX, 0  NX, and 
N,'  N&. Therefore, equation (11) becomes 
pdN& , 0, ν;ωgNX,νf  pdN,' , 0, ν;ωgNX,νf  pdNX, 0, ν;ωgNX,νf     (13) 
From equation (13) follows another test: the inequality indices pdN& , 0, ν;ωgNX,νf, obtained by 
equation (19), for different values of parameter ν should be (approximately) equal to the inequality 
indices obtained for pdNX, 0, ν;ωgNX,νf. Otherwise, the estimates of the DJA indices would be biased, 
and we should try to obtain an alternative configuration of y{ &NX. 
3.4 Decompositions  
Having defined all the indices needed, we can present RE and its decompositions in terms of sample 
estimate formulas. RE is obtained as ∆ pNX  pNY. According to the DJA model from (3), RE is 
decomposed as follows: 
∆ #  $p   %  
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 qpNX  pdN&fr  qpdN,' f  pdN&fr  qpNY  pdN,' fr   qpNX  pdN&fr  qpNX  pdN&fr  qpNY  pNXr    (14) 
where the last row in equation (14) arrives from the property (11), by which pdN,' f  pNX. The 
differences in the brackets, i.e., #  pNX  pdN&f, $p  pdN,' f  pdN&f  pNX  pdN&f, and 
%  pNY  pdN,' f  pNY  pNX, are respectively the sample estimates of the vertical, CHI, and 
reranking effects of the DJA model. Note that, if cNX is used instead of pNX, the CHI and 
reranking effects would be biased. Furthermore, if the estimates N& are inappropriate, the vertical 
and CHI effect would be biased. 
Setting   0 and following (4) and (5), we can calculate the S-Gini K84 decomposition as 
∆  #J ν   %K'J ν  qpdNX, 0,ν;ωgNX,νf  pdNX, 0,ν;ωgNX,νfr  qpdNY, 0, ν;ωgNY,νf  pdNX, 0, ν;ωgNX,νfr  (15) 
3.5 Simple Hypothetical Example  
We return to the example of four hypothetical households from section 2 to illustrate how the DJA 
model implementation procedures work. There are two groups of pre-fiscal equals in the sample: A 
and B with pre-fiscal income of 10 each belong to the lower quantile, whereas C and D with pre-
fiscal income of 20 each belong to the upper quantile of pre-fiscal income distribution.  
The first column in Table 1 shows the ‘original’ weights bNX,ν obtained by (8) for ν  2; 
observe that A (C) obtains larger weight than B (D), although they belong to same pre-fiscal 
quantile. Therefore, analogously to the procedure from equation (9), we obtain the new set of 
weights, ωgNX,ν: for A and B (C and D) we have ωgX  ωgjX  bX _ bjX/2 [ωgX  ωgX  bX _ bX/2]. 
Table 1 
As equation (11) explains, the estimate of ' can be obtained in two ways: by pdN,' f or 
by pNX. In the former case, we first obtain the values N,' , which are the sample estimates of 
',    (|, ( . The values (| for the lower (upper) quantile are represented by 
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X and jX (X and X), and the corresponding utilities are X and jX [X and X]. 
The expected post-fiscal utility at each quantile is simply the average utility of units belonging to the 
corresponding quantile: '  j'  X _ jX/2 and '  '  X _ X/2, for 
the lower and the upper quantiles, respectively.  
According to (20), for ν  2 and   0.5 we have that 

o dN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf  2 · ' · ωgX _ 2 · ' · ωgX  7.21 
and pdN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf  0.133. Substituting back previously obtained utility terms into the expression 
for welfare, we obtain  

o dN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf  X _ jX · ωgX _ X _ X · ωgX  7.21 
which is identical to the result that would be obtained by (18): 

o dNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf  X · ωgX _ jX · ωgjX _ X · ωgX _ X · ωgX  7.21, 
Thus, our hypothetical example confirms the identity (11). On the other hand, indices based 
on the ‘wrong’ weights, bNX,ν, would produce quite a different picture. By (17) we have  

 dNX, , ν; bNX,νf  X · bX _ jX · bjX _ X · bX _ X · bX  6.89, 
and cdNX, , ν; bNX,νf  0.210. 
The estimate of & is obtained as pdN& , , ν;ωgNX,νf from (19), which is in turn based on 
sample estimates N& of &   (|( . In this example we can simply calculate &  j& 
X _ jX/2 and &  &  X _ X/2. According to (19), 

o dN& , , ν;ωgNX,νf  2 · & · ωgX _ 2 · & · ωgX  7.32, 
and pdN&, , ν;ωgNX,νf  0.108. 
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All inequality indices for ν  2 and   0.5 are presented in the first column of Table 2, 
together with the DJA decomposition results. Although the vertical effect of the hypothetical system 
is positive (#  0.081), the redistributive effect is negative (∆ 0.052), because the CHI effect 
($p  0.026) and especially the reranking effect (%  0.107) are very large. 
Table 2 
Another set of CHI and reranking effects is derived using cNX, which is based on the 
weights bNX,ν. They show a completely different picture of the relative contributions of CHI 
($c  0.102 vs. $p  0.026) and reranking (%  0.030 vs. %  0.107) to the overall HI. We have 
indicated that the weights ωgNX,ν are the ‘right ones’, but to demonstrate this in our example, we have 
to obtain the indices for ν  2 and   0, shown in the second column of Table 2. 
Recall that equation (13) says that the inequality indices based on NX, N,' , and N& must be 
equal when   0; this is true for pNX  0.100, but not for cNX  0.183. The difference 
cNX  pNX  0.083 presents by how much the CHI effect, which should be zero when   0, is 
overestimated if the weights bNX,ν are used in computation of the inequality index for post-fiscal 
incomes NX. 
Finally, we look at how DAD-DJA deals with this small hypothetical case. The DAD 
supporting documentation tells us that the estimate of ' is obtained by the index based on NX; 
its value for ν  2 and   0 (0.183) is identical to cNX. This indicates that DAD-DJA does not 
envisage the presence of exact equals in the sample. The third column in Table 2 shows the other 
results. The index pdN&f diverges highly from our estimate (0.500 vs. 0.100), but this may be due to 
the small sample size. We deal with the DAD-DJA estimates of EPIs in the next section. 
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4 APPLICATION: CROATIAN TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEM 
4.1 Data 
We analyze the fiscal system consisting of social security contributions (SSC) for the pension, health, 
and unemployment insurance funds, personal income tax and surtax (PITS), public pensions, and 
cash social benefits.6 The data on incomes come from the Croatian household budget survey (Anketa 
o potrošnji kućanstava; APK) for 2008, whose sample contains 3,108 households. Since APK 
registers only net incomes of household members, the amounts of pre-fiscal income, PITS, and SSC 
are obtained by a microsimulation model. 
Post-fiscal income of a household i is obtained as MN  MN  MN _ M N, where MN, MN, and M N are 
pre-fiscal income, the sum of all taxes paid, and the sum of all benefits received. To obtain N and N, 
MN and MN are deflated by the equivalence factor PN according to the ‘modified OECD scale’, 
PN  1 _ 0.5N  1 _ 0.3N, where N  and N are numbers of adults and children in household i. 
Before analyzing the results of the DJA decomposition, we observe the features of the data 
set. The dots in the scattergram (Figure 1) are the post-fiscal and pre-fiscal incomes of sample 
income units, expressed in terms of the mean pre-fiscal income (mpfi). The full line shows EPIs 
obtained by KWLPR (see next section for details on estimation). The dotted line represents the 
cumulative density, which tells us, for each pre-fiscal income X, the proportion of all income units 
having pre-fiscal income below X (on the right axis). We can observe that quite a large proportion of 
units, about 7 percent, have zero pre-fiscal income (group A), while the next 13 percent of units 
have pre-fiscal income below 10 percent of mpfi (group B). 
Figure 1 
The mean post-fiscal incomes of groups A and B are 64 and 54 percent of mpfi, respectively. 
Observe that the EPIs curve is decreasing on the interval [0, 0.1]. The following three facts taken 
together can explain the curious feature that the mean post-fiscal income is decreasing. First, for the 
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majority of pensioners’ households a public pension is the only source of income; since public 
pensions are benefits in the current scenario, the pre-fiscal income of most pensioners’ households 
is zero. Second, majority of households with zero pre-fiscal income (group A) are pensioners’ 
households. Third, pensions are on average higher than other social benefits.  
4.2 Estimation of Expected Post-fiscal Incomes and the Decomposition 
The indices of the DJA decomposition are estimated by three models, using three different fitting 
methods described in section 3.3.  
In model A, EPIs are estimated by KWLPR programmed in Stata 12. Following Bilger (2008), 
we use the 3rd degree local polynomials, employing the Epanechnikov kernel. The optimal half-
bandwidth of the kernel obtained by the program was equal to 6.7 percent of mpfi and it was 
increased by one half. In model B, EPIs are obtained using FSTF programmed in Matlab R2011b’s 
Curve Fitting Toolbox 3.2. The number of harmonics is set to 7; the “Trust-Region” algorithm is 
employed with the robust fitting option turned off. In both models the top five pre-fiscal income 
units are excluded from the fitting process, and their values of N& are set to the values of NX. The 
size of the half-bandwidth in model A and the number of harmonics in model B are chosen to 
minimize the bias pdNX, 0, ν;ωgNX,νf  pdN&, 0, ν;ωgNX,νf. For the estimates of ', we used 
pdNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf with weights ωgNX,ν obtained by equation (9). 
The aim of model C is to replicate the results obtained by DAD-DJA. We employ DAD-LLE to 
estimate EPIs, with all observations included in the fitting process. To estimate ', DAD-DJA also 
uses the index based on NX, but does not envisage the possibility of pre-fiscal exact equals. To play 
down the bias in the calculation of reranking and CHI effects, we randomize the order of income 
units within the group of zero pre-fiscal equals; these data are then put into DAD-DJA to obtain the 
original estimates, while in the replication we calculate cdNX, , ν; bNX,νf. 
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Before moving on to the results, let us look at the shapes of the different EPIs curves, shown 
in Figure 2, concentrating first on the bottom part of the income distribution. While A and B both 
reflect the initial fall in expected post-fiscal income, discussed above, C does not, i.e., its EPIs curve is 
rather flat on the whole interval. For pre-fiscal income of zero all estimates are roughly the same, 
but in the pre-fiscal income interval [0.025, 0.42] of mpfi, C’s EPIs lie above those estimated by A 
and B. On the pre-fiscal income interval [0, 0.5] of mpfi the mean of EPIs obtained by A (B) is 0.5764 
(0.5775) of mpfi, which is very close to the mean post-fiscal income for actual values, equal to 
0.5762. On the other hand, the mean of EPIs obtained by C is 0.5881, or 2 percent above the actual 
mean. This suggests that C overestimates EPIs for the lowest incomes. For pre-fiscal incomes above 
0.5 of mpfi, the EPIs of B and C are almost identical, while the EPIs curve of A is “more flexible” and 
intertwining the other two curves. 
Figure 2 
Models A and B convincingly pass the test from equation (12), as the ratios !̂dN&f/!̂NX in 
Table 3 are 0.999732 and 1.0, respectively. On the other hand, for method C, !̂dN&f is 1.75 percent 
higher than !̂NX. This is partly the consequence of the earlier noticed overestimation on the 
interval [0, 0.5] of mpfi. However, there is another feature that is particularly odd: the estimate N& 
for the two income units with top pre-fiscal incomes are 2.4 and 6.4 times larger than their 
respective actual post-fiscal incomes NX! In this case we can talk about a ‘bug’ in DJA-LLE, which 
seriously damages the estimate of !̂dN&f, which will lead to biased estimates of vertical and CHI 
effects, as we will soon observe. Table 3 shows the results of the DJA decomposition for ν  2 and 
  0. All three models obtain equal values of pNX and pNY. Models A and B obtain the value of 
pNX equal to 0.244337, which is almost insignificantly different from the value of cNX obtained 
by model C, thanks to randomizing the order of income units within the group of zero pre-fiscal 
equals. If the units within the group of zero pre-fiscal equals were, by chance, sorted in increasing 
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(or decreasing) order of post-fiscal income, the difference cNX  pNX for the given data set 
could be as high as 0.001183. The reranking and CHI effects in model C could be seriously biased. 
Table 3 
The estimates pdN&f obtained by A and B are close to the value of  pNX, as expected from 
equation (13); the differences pNX  pdN&f are -0.000203 and -0.000180, or between -0.09 and 
0.08 percent of the corresponding RE (∆). For the model C, the difference  pNX  pdN&f is no less 
than -0.007104, or -3.3 percent of RE, meaning that the bias produced by C is about 35 times larger 
than the bias of A and B. 
Table 4 
Model C thus underestimates the vertical effect by about 3 percent of RE for  ν  2 and   0. 
This underestimation is even larger (somewhat smaller) for  ν  1.5 and   0 ( ν  3 and   0) 
and amounts to 5.9 (2.4) percent of RE, as Table 4 indicates. Among the scenarios shown in Table 4, 
the differences in the estimates of vertical effect obtained by models C and A (B) are lowest when 
 ν  2 and   0.9, equaling 0.8 (0.9) percent of RE. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Models decomposing the redistributive effect of fiscal systems into vertical and horizontal effects 
are extensively used by practitioners. The Duclos, Jalbert, and Araar (2003) model, despite its 
advantages over some other models, such as the Kakwani’s (1984) and the Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert’s (1994) decompositions of RE, has not yet been broadly employed in empirical research. 
The reason may be the relatively complex implementation procedure, which involves non-
parametric methods in estimation of expected post-fiscal incomes. 
To override these estimation and calculation difficulties, the designers of the software DAD 
have incorporated a module for estimation of the DJA model indices, here referred to as DAD-DJA. 
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However, as the application data on the Croatian tax-benefit system indicates, DAD-DJA produces 
somewhat inaccurate estimates of EPIs, resulting in biased values of DJA model indices. This paper 
carefully explains the estimation procedures needed to obtain the indices of the DJA model, and the 
problems occurring in DAD-DJA implementation. 
The estimates of expected post-fiscal incomes are obtained by two fitting methods, kernel-
weighted local polynomial regression and Fourier series in trigonometric form. Both achieve 
reasonable fit of the data at stake, unlike the method built into DAD-DJA, which seems to 
overestimate EPIs at the bottom region of pre-fiscal income distribution. Furthermore, we have 
realized that the fitting procedure in DAD-DJA contains a ‘bug’, producing unreasonably high 
estimates of EPIs for the top pre-fiscal income units in the sample. 
We have shown how the estimation of EPUs can be circumvented, saving a practitioner time 
when doing multiple-scenario analysis. Instead of estimating EPUs for each different value of 
parameter ε , the index of inequality based on EPUs can be obtained simply by using post-fiscal 
incomes ordered according to pre-fiscal incomes. In this procedure, however, caution must be taken 
in the presence of large groups of exact pre-fiscal equals: they should all be ascribed identical 
ranking weights. Otherwise, an estimate of reranking effect would be biased. 
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APPENDIX 1 SAMPLE ESTIMATES OF INEQUALITY INDICES 
The sample estimates of Atkinson-Gini Inequality indices based on NY , NX , N&  and N' are obtained 
in the following equations: 
NY,   NY/1            
o dNY, , ν;ωgNY,νf  ∑ d^Y, f · φY^ · ωgY^,νV^a         
pdNY, , ν;ωgNY,νf  1  q1  
o dNY, , ν;ωgNY,νfr sstu/!̂NY    (16) 
 NX,   NX/1            
 dNX, , ν; bNX,νf  ∑ d^X, f · φX^ · bX^,νV^a         
cdNX, , ν; bNX,νf  1  q1  
 dNX, , ν; bNX,νfr sstu/!̂NX    (17) 
  
o dNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf  ∑ d^X, f · φX^ · ωg X^,νV^a         
pdNX, , ν;ωgNX,νf  1  q1  
o dNX, , ν;ωgNX,νfr sstu/!̂NX    (18) 
 dN&, f  dN&f/1            
o dN& , , ν;ωgNX,νf  ∑ d^& , f · φX^ · ωg X^,νV^a         
pdN& , , ν;ωgNX,νf  1  q1  
o dN& , , ν;ωgNX,νfr sstu/!̂dN&f    (19) 
 
o dN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf  ∑ N,' · φX^ · ωg X^,νV^a         
pdN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νf  1  q1  
o dN,' , , ν;ωgNX,νfr sstu/!̂NX    (20) 
where !̂NY, !̂NX, and !̂dN&f are means of post-fiscal income variables, equal to !̂NY 
Σ ∑ φY^ ·V^a ^Y, !̂NX  Σ ∑ φX^ ·V^a ^X, and !̂dN&f  Σ ∑ φX^ ·V^a ^& , respectively. It is 
clear that !̂NX  !̂NY, because NX and NY contain the same sample values, only differently 
sorted. 
23 
 
ENDNOTES 
1 Araar and Duclos (2003, 2006) describe the properties of AGF based inequality indices: “Income 
inequality aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is 
captured by rank-dependent ethical weights, thus providing an ethically-flexible dual basis for the 
assessment of inequality and equity” (Araar and Duclos 2006, 192). Furthermore, it is shown that 
AGF is the only family of social evaluation functions “to obey a set of popular axioms in the income 
distribution literature” (Araar and Duclos 2006, 204). 
2 Independent proof of this relationship can be found in Yitzhaki and Olkin (1991), who derive the 
“relative concentration curve” of post-fiscal income N with respect to pre-fiscal income X as 
$, ,   !*  y"~ts , where y  |   corresponds to &. Duclos 
and Araar (2006) present the same concentration curve as $, ,   !*  & , from 
which the S-Gini concentration coefficient is obtained as I, ν   qd  $, , fr ϖ, ν, 
where ϖ, ν  νν  11  νj are rank-dependent weights. 
3 These authors have derived their indices using the “cost of inequality” approach, compared with 
the “change of inequality” approach used in this paper. Duclos, Jalbert, and Araar (2003) employ 
both approaches. 
4 According to Ebert (1997, 1999) this is the right approach to investigate the concepts of Lorenz 
dominance, social welfare function, and progressive transfers when populations are heterogeneous. 
Using the number of ‘real’ household members, N, instead of the number of ‘equivalent’ members, 
PN, leads to “some unpleasant and unsatisfactory paradoxa or impossibility results”. The usual 
objection to this approach is that “not all persons have the same weight and significance”, which 
contradicts the democratic principles; for the rebuttal of this objection see Ebert (1999, 251). 
5 Available online at: http://132.203.59.36/DAD/manual/help_44.htm. 
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6 Basic support allowances, unemployment benefit, child allowance, sick-leave benefit, maternity 
and layette supplement, and supplement for the injured and support for rehabilitation and 
employment of people with disabilities. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Hypothetical population: weight, incomes, and utilities 
# bNX ωgNX  NX  NX NY N&  NX NX NY N& N,'  
1 (A) 0.438 0.375 10 8 8 12 6.32 5.66 5.66 6.93 6.83 
2 (B) 0.313 0.375 10 16 12 12 6.32 8.00 6.93 6.93 6.83 
3 (C) 0.188 0.125 20 12 16 18 8.94 6.93 8.00 8.49 8.36 
4 (D) 0.063 0.125 20 24 24 18 8.94 9.80 9.80 8.49 8.36 
 1 1 60 60 60 60 30.54 30.38 30.38 30.83 30.38 
Note: weights are obtained for ν  2; utilities are obtained for   0.5. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Indices obtained for hypothetical population 
 
ν  2   0.5 ν  2   0 
DAD-DJA 
ν  2   0 pNX 0.188 0.167 0.167 pNY 0.240 0.217 0.217 cNX 0.210 0.183 0.183 pNX 0.133 0.100  pdN,' f 0.133 0.100  pN& 0.108 0.100 0.500 ∆ pNX  pNY -0.052 -0.050 -0.050 #  pNX  pN& 0.081 0.067 -0.333 $p  pNX  pN& 0.026 0.000  %  pNY  pNX 0.107 0.117  $c  cNX  pN& 0.102 0.083 -0.317 %  pNY  cNX 0.030 0.033 0.033 
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Table 3 
Decomposition of redistributive effect for ν  2 and   0 
 A B C A B C 
    As percentage of pNX pNX 0.506665 0.506665 0.506665 100.00 100.00 100.00 pNY 0.291511 0.291511 0.291511 57.54 57.54 57.54 cNX   0.244328   48.22 pNX 0.244337 0.244337  48.22 48.22  pN& 0.244540 0.244517 0.251432 48.26 48.26 49.62 
      As percentage of ∆  ∆  0.215154 0.215154 0.215154 100.00 100.00 100.00 #  0.262124 0.262148 0.255233 121.83 121.84 118.63 $p  -0.000203 -0.000180 -0.007104 -0.09 -0.08 -3.30 %  0.047174 0.047174 0.047183 21.93 21.93 21.93 
          !̂N&/!̂NX
 
0.999732 1.000000 1.017489    
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Table 4 
Decomposition of redistributive effect for different combinations of ν and  
 A B C A B C 
 ν  1.5 and   0 As percentage of ∆  ∆  0.143358 0.143358 0.143358 100.00 100.00 100.00 #  0.167811 0.167880 0.159522 117.06 117.11 111.28 $p  -0.000139 -0.000070 -0.008432 -0.10 -0.05 -5.88 %  0.024592 0.024592 0.024596 17.15 17.15 17.16 
 ν  3 and   0 As percentage of ∆  ∆  0.287304 0.287304 0.287304 100.00 100.00 100.00 #  0.374837 0.374568 0.368302 130.47 130.37 128.19 $p  -0.000258 -0.000527 -0.006815 -0.09 -0.18 -2.37 %  0.087792 0.087792 0.087813 30.56 30.56 30.56 
 ν  1.5 and   0.5 As percentage of ∆  ∆  0.303136 0.303136 0.303136 100.00 100.00 100.00 #  0.350112 0.350366 0.343239 115.50 115.58 113.23 $p  0.023835 0.024088 0.016965 7.86 7.95 5.60 %  0.023142 0.023142 0.023138 7.63 7.63 7.63 
 ν  2 and   0.5 As percentage of ∆  ∆  0.352147 0.352147 0.352147 100.00 100.00 100.00 #  0.422453 0.422651 0.416784 119.96 120.02 118.36 $p  0.026372 0.026570 0.020713 7.49 7.55 5.88 %  0.043934 0.043934 0.043924 12.48 12.48 12.47 
 ν  2 and   0.9 As percentage of ∆  ∆  0.577556 0.577556 0.577556 100.00 100.00 100.00 #  0.670484 0.670828 0.665771 116.09 116.15 115.27 $p  0.051673 0.052018 0.047002 8.95 9.01 8.14 %  0.041255 0.041255 0.041213 7.14 7.14 7.14 
 ν  1 and   0.9 As percentage of ∆  ∆  0.592622 0.592622 0.592622 100.00 100.00 100.00 #  0.635048 0.635456 0.627648 107.16 107.23 105.91 $p  0.042426 0.042834 0.035025 7.16 7.23 5.91 %  0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 
Scattergram of pre- and post-fiscal incomes 
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Notes: (a) each point represents one sample income unit; (b) EPIs – expected post-fiscal incomes 
obtained by KWLPR (see details in section 4.2); (c) CD – cumulative density function. 
29 
 
Figure 2 
Scattergram of pre- and post-fiscal incomes 
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Note: (a) each point represents one sample income unit; (b) A, B, and C – estimates of expected post-
fiscal incomes obtained by KWLPR, FTTF, and DJA-LLE fitting methods, respectively (see details in 
section 4.2). 
 
